Abstract. Most modern security protocols and security applications are de ned to be algorithm independent, that is, they allow a choice from a set of cryptographic algorithms for the same function. Therefore a key-search machine which is also de ned to be algorithm independent might be interesting. We researched the feasibility of a universal key-search machine using the Data Encryption Standard (DES) as an example algorithm. Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) provide an ideal match for an algorithm independent cracker as they can switch algorithms on-the-y and run much faster than software. We designed, implemented and compared various architecture options of DES with strong emphasis on high-speed performance. Techniques like pipelining and loop unrolling were used and their e ectiveness for DES on FPGAs investigated. The most interesting result is that we could achieve data rates of up to 403 Mbit/s using a standard Xilinx FPGA. This result is by a factor 31 faster than software implementations while we are still maintaining exibility. A DES cracker chip based on this design could search 6.29 million keys per second.
Introduction
Building a key-search machine in hardware is a major investment. Such a machine can be used to retrieve secrete keys for only one algorithm. Most modern security protocols are de ned algorithm independent and the protocol standards support a variety of algorithms. Therefore it might be interesting to have a keysearch machine which is also de ned algorithm independent, supporting a variety of algorithms.
It is fairly easy to switch cryptographic algorithms in software, but it is dicult in hardware. On the other hand, hardware solutions provide better performance. One answer to this problem is recon gurable hardware, based on modern Field Programmable Gate Array, or FPGA, devices. FPGAs can switch algorithms, they can thus be used to build algorithm agile applications. Although at a given time only one algorithm is con gured, the FPGA can be recon gured with a di erent algorithm. The following lists the main advantages of cryptographic algorithms on FPGAs { Algorithm agility, the same FPGA can be reprogrammed at run time to support di erent algorithms, { Scalable security, through di erent versions of the same algorithm (e.g., Data Encryption Standard (DES) and triple-DES), { Alterable architecture parameters, e.g., desirable features such as variable S-boxes, variable number of rounds, or di erent modes of operation can easily be realized,
We designed a universal key-search machine and used a high speed DES implementation for FPGAs as an algorithm. DES is currently the most widely used private-key algorithm and it is also part of many other standards, e.g., IPSec protocols, ATM cell encryption, the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol, and for various ANSI banking standards. Even though it is expected that DES will not be reapproved as a federal US standard this year, it is still important and will continue to play a major role for several years to come.
In Sect. 2 we summarize previous relevant work. Section 3 explores di erent architecture options for DES like loop unrolling and pipelining and presents the architecture versions we decided to implement. In Sect. 4 we provide an overview of the projected universal key-search machine. Section 5 describes the design and implementation cycle and gives an overview of the hardware and software tools we used for our research. In Sect. 6 we present and compare the results of our implementations of the di erent architectures and extrapolate cost and speed of the proposed universal key-search machine running a DES Cracker chip.
Previous Work
Already one year after the Data Encryption Standard was released in 1976, Whit eld Di e and Martin Hellman published a paper which describes in detail a key-search machine for DES 2]. They estimated that for $ 20 million a keysearch machine could be built which recoveres a DES key within 12 hours. Two papers with quite di erent results appeared in 1993 6] and 13]. Both papers describe a custom chip design and develop from there a key-search machine.
Reference 13] calculates 3.5 hours time to break DES at $1 million. Their chip can test 50 million keys per second. The design shown in 6] uses 32 DES breaker (DESB) chips and breaks DES in 1.2 days, each DESB chip can test 5333 million keys per second. This number appears to be very high. The estimated cost including overhead is only $2500 which appears to be very low to us.
Modern custom hardware implementations of DES can achieve data rates of 1 Gbit/sec and beyond. References 4, 3] were the rst report of a custom chip employing modern GaAs technology to achieve 1 Gbit/sec. This design as well as many commercially available devices do not support a key change at full speed; i.e. a di erent key for every block of plain text.
The rst paper to show an implementation of DES on FPGAs is 8]. Their approach generates key-speci c circuitry for the Xilinx FPGAs. Therefore a binary image (bit-stream) for each key has to be precomputed before it can be used in the device. As for a key search machine the key has to be changed after every encryption, this chip is not suitable for this task. Their fastest implementation without decryption and adjusted to one key achieves a data rate of 26 Mbit/sec.
A group of cryptographers analyzed in 1996 the security of the key lengths of symetric ciphers based on current technology. In their report 1] employing FPGAs is highlited as an e cient approach for a brute-force attack against cryptographic systems. FPGAs are inexpensive, fast, and they need less inital investment than Application-Speci c Integrated Circuits (ASIC). If we just take the plain FPGA cost for our design into account we would neet to invest three times as much money as 1] to recover keys at the same speed.
Architecture Options for the DES Algorithm
A high speed implementation of DES is crucial for an e cient DES cracker. But not only speed is an important factor, the design also must support a fast key change.
Basic DES
The DES algorithm possesses an iterative structure 10]. Data is passed through the Feistel network 16 times, each time with a di erent sub-key from the key transformation. This structure leads itself naturally to the block diagram shown in Fig. 1 . The incoming data and key are passed through initial permutations. Then the data passes 16 times through the Feistel network and also 16 sub-keys are generated simultaneously. Both, the Feistel network operation and the subkey generation is denoted in the block diagram as Combinatorial Logic (CLU, combinatorial logic unit). In order to be able to loop the output back to the input of the combinatorial logic unit we need Registers and Multiplexers. The multiplexer switches the input of the combinatorial logic unit between data from the previous round and new input data and key. The registers store the results of each loop and pass them on to the multiplexer. The output of the data register passes through the Final Permutation.
Loop Unrolling
Loop unrolling is the concatenation of combinatorial units in order to reduce the number of iterations if, for instance, two loops are unrolled then two rounds of DES will be calculated with one clock cycle. Figure 2 shows the block diagram. This block diagram di ers from Fig. 1 only in the 2nd combinatorial logic unit. The initial and nal permutations as well as the registers and multiplexers are the same.
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Fig. 1. DES block diagram
Loop unrolling leads potentially to speed improvements for the following reason. In the not unrolled version, one iteration of DES has the following simple timing model: T mux + T cl + T reg , where T mux denotes the time a signal needs to pass through a multiplexer, T cl the delay introduced by the combinatorial logic, and T reg the delay introduced by the register. Wiring delays are assumed to be included in the speci ed times for the elements. So for the whole 16 rounds this sums up to: 16 T mux + 16 T cl + 16 T reg .
The equation for one loop of the structure in Fig. 2 is thus: T mux +2 T cl +T reg . This has to be executed 8 times, so that the over-all delay is now: 8 T mux +16 T cl + 8 T reg . The same principle can be applied to four unrolled DES rounds resulting in: 4 T mux + 16 T cl + 4 T reg .
Obviously we can not reduce the delay introduced by the combinatorial logic units but we reduced the runs through the multiplexers and bu ers. There is also another motivation for speed increase if modern design methods are applied. It is possible that the synthesis tools can optimize an unrolled design better, due to boundary optimization. Loop unrolling works thus well with a modern design process which can reduce the logic complexity and delay of the design.
Pipelining
Pipelining tries to achieve a speed improvement in a di erent way. Instead of processing one block of data at a time, a pipelined design can process two or more data blocks simultaneously. A design with two pipelines is shown in Fig. 3 . 
Fig. 2. Block diagram of DES with two unrolled loops
The block diagram in Fig. 3 is very similar to the one with the two unrolled loops (Fig. 2) . The only di erence is the additional bu er between the combinatorial logic units. The rst block of data x 1 and the associated key k 1 are loaded and passed through the initial permutations and the multiplexer. The 1st combinatorial logic unit computes x 1;1 and k 1;1 which are stored into the 1st register block. On the next clock cycle x 1;1 and k 1;1 leave the 1st registers and the 2nd combinatorial logic unit computes x 1;2 and k 1;2 which are put into the 2nd register block. At the same time the second block of data x 2 and the key k 2 are loaded and passed through the initial permutations, and the multiplexer, and the 1st combinatorial unit computes x 2;1 and k 2;1 which are moved into the 1st register block. Now the pipeline is lled and with each clock cycle another iteration for two pairs of data and key are computed. The data which has entered the pipeline rst, will also exit it rst. At that time the next data and key pair can be loaded. The advantage of this design is that two or more data{key pairs can be worked upon at the same time. As there is still only one instance of the initial permutations, the multiplexer and the nal permutation, the cost in terms of resources on the chip will not be twice as high as if we implemented two full nonpipelined DES designs. Also there has to be only one control logic which is just slightly more complicated than for a non-pipelined DES design. The maximum clock speed should be roughly the same since during one clock cycle the same amount of logic resources has to be traversed as in the non-pipelined design. It is also straightforward to design pipelines with more than two stages, e.g., with four.
Combination of Pipelining and Loop Unrolling
It is possible to combine both architecture acceleration techniques that we described above. For instance, each pipeline stage can contain two unrolled loops. The resulting block diagram looks similar to Fig. 3 except that each combinatorial logic unit is duplicated. During one clock cycle two iterations of two data{key pairs are computed: x 1;4 and k 1;4 are computed from x 1;2 and k 1;2 , and x 2;2 and k 2;2 are computed from x 2 and k 2 . An extension to four unrolled loops per pipeline stage is also possible.
Design Decisions
One major objective of this research was to obtain a realistic comparison of the di erent acceleration methods (loop unrolling, pipelining, combination of both)
for FPGAs. Table 1 shows the architecture versions we decided to implement, results of which are described in Section 6. The design of the Universal Key-Search Machine has to be algorithm independent. Therefore no assumption on the length of the plain text, cipher text, or key is made. The system architecture is described in the following subsection and the modi cations necessary for our DES FPGA 7] to meet the I/O requirements for this architecture in the next subsection.
System Architecture
Our biggest concern is scalability. Therefore one design goal is to have a minimum amount of wiring and additional external logic (glue logic). A bus topology and an optimized addressing scheme was developed to meet this requirement. The addressing scheme requires no address decoding logic and there is no logical limit on the number of key-search chips connected to the bus. Figure 4 gives an overview of the system architecture. When more key-search chips are attached additional bu ers are needed to drive the bus. These bus drivers are left out of Fig. 4 for simplicity. The cracker-bus comprises an bidirectional 16 bit wide data bus, the control signals, IE (input enable) and OE (output enable), four chip select signals, CS (chip select), CSI (chip select in), CSO (chip select out), and CSCLK (chip select clock), and an indicator done.
The function of the control chip is to interface the cracker-bus with the ISA bus of a PC. We use DESC, the DES Cracker chip, as an example.
The system supports sequential as well as parallel access. When CS is active all chips are selected and listening to the bus. The plain text and the cipher text can be send with IE to every chip at the same time. A di erent start key has to be sent to each chip. For this purpose we implemented an sequential addressing scheme. The signals CSI, CSO, and CSCLK work with the chips as a long shift register. The control chip sends a logic`1' to the rst chip. With Fig. 4 . System architecture each clock CSCLK this`1' is passed from CSO to CSI of the next chip; the next chip is selected and the start key can be send with IE. The number of clock cycles CSCLK it takes for the`1' to come back to the control chip is equal to the number of key-search chips put in. With OE the current key of the selected chip is clocked out. With this function the state of the key-search machine can be saved or the nal key can be retrieved. The done signal is a tristated signal pulled to logic`0' with a resistor. When the key is found this signal goes to`1'. Now the control chip addresses sequentially the chips. The chip which found the key takes the`1' o as soon as it is selected. Through this scheme the controller can identify the chip.
DES Cracker-Chip
The DES cracker chip (see Fig. 5 ) is based on our DES FPGA 7] denoted as DES Core in the Figure. Each of the implemented DES architectures shown in Table 1 can be used as a DES Core. Our DES FPGA is not optimized for keysearch but it supports a key change for every block of plain text at full speed. The bu ers for the cipher text and the plain text are 64 bits wide, the bu er for the start key 56 bits. The bus can transfer 16 bits at a time, therefore the bu ers are split up in parts of maximum 16 bits. They are addressed through a shift register (not shown in Fig. 5 ). When the chip is selected the signal IE cycles through the input bu ers. The 4 16 bits output register for the current key is addressed via a 4 bits shift register, which in turn is operated through the OE signal when the chip is selected. Early in the design we decided upon Xilinx as FPGA vendor and a device family. That decision was based mainly on our previous work described in 5] . The entire design was implemented using VHDL and vendor speci c macros. We used Synopsys version 1997.08 for the synthesis, logic optimization, design veri cation, and timing analysis.
Xilinx Alliance Series version M1.3.7 provided macro functions (LogiBLOX) and was used for the place and route. The Xilinx tools also perform a timing analysis after place and route which shows the minimum clock period for the given design. This clock period is guaranteed by Xilinx for the design and therefore is to be seen as rather pessimistic. We are using this timing result for our speed calculations.
Results
We implemented multiple versions of each architecture option listed in Table 1 in order to evaluate their e ectiveness. In the following sections we compare the different designs. In most cases the designs are compared to the design DES ED16 which serves as our reference model. The unit CLB stands for combinatorial logic block which is employed by Xilinx to measure the amount of logic resources on a device. We are using it here to compare the amount of logic resources used by a given design. The abbreviation CLU stands for combinatorial logic unit (see Chap. 3), i.e., one Feistel network round.
Loop Unrolling
We implemented two loop unrolled versions: DES ED8 and DES ED4. The design DES ED8 contains two combinatorial logic units (CLU, see Sect. 3.2) and therefore encrypts or decrypts one data block in 8 clock cycles. The design DES ED4 contains four CLUs and provides the result after 4 clock cycles. Both designs are compared with the design DES ED16 in Table 2 . Our standard DES design DES ED16 allowed already for data rates of 99.1 Mbit/sec 2 . The design DES ED8 is with 148.2 Mbit/sec 50% faster than DES ED16 whereas the resource consumption (in CLBs) increases by 69%. The design DES ED4 is with 184.5 Mbit/sec only 25% faster than DES ED8, the speed increase is only half as much as from the rst unrolling. The resource consumption increases by 63%.
The number of CLBs divided by the number of CLUs indicates that the amount of logic resources consumed per unrolled CLU is almost constant. The speed divided by the number of CLUs shows that the speed for one CLU in the design DES ED4 is less then half the speed of DES ED16. From this we can see that loop unrolling shows a non-linear speed improvement. It seems unlikely that a fourth loop unrolling would yield signi cantly higher performance.
Pipelining
We implemented two pipelined designs, DES ED16x2 and DES ED16x4. The design DES ED16x2 contains two CLUs and therefore 2 pipeline stages and the design DES ED16x4 contains four CLUs and therefore 4 pipeline stages. The encryption or decryption of one block of data takes in both cases 16 clock cycles. Table 3 compares both designs with the design DES ED16. The design DES ED16x2 with two pipeline stages is with 183.8 Mbit/sec almost twice as fast as our reference design DES ED16. And our design 2 Mbit= 10 6 bit DES ED16x4 achieves 402.7 Mbit/sec which is four times faster. The speed divided by the number of CLUs shows that the speed per CLU stays almost constant for all designs. The lower speed for the design DES ED16x2 is caused by the lack of wiring resources on the device which results in a less e cient design.
The amount of logic resources consumed per implemented CLB is decreasing if we create more pipelines. This is due to the fact that the control unit does not become more complicated if we implement more pipelines. Also the multiplexers are implemented only once.
It is interesting to compare the pipelined designs with the loop unrolled designs. It can be seen that DES ED16x2 is both faster and smaller than the loop unrolled DES ED8. The di erence is even more dramatically if the DES ED16x4 is compared with the DES ED4. DES ED16 is more than twice as fast as DES ED4 and utilizes almost the same amount of CLBs.
Combination of Pipelining and Loop Unrolling
A design that contains loop unrolling as well as pipelining is in the simplest version already as large as the largest designs we have implemented so far which were DES ED16x4 and DES ED4. Therefore we implemented only the design DES ED8x2 which contains 4 CLUs; 2 in each of the 2 pipeline stages. Table 4 compares this design with DES ED16x2 and DES ED8. It is not easy to compare this mixed design with the two other designs. The minimum clock period shows that the time it takes for two CLUs (loop unrolled) to execute in the design DES ED8x2 is faster than in the design DES ED8. It is of course slower, but surprisingly not much, than one CLU in the design DES 16x2.
Extrapolation for Cracker
Our fastest design is DES ED16x4 with a data rate of 402 Mbit/sec. This design could be the DES Core for our DES Cracker-Chip (DESC) as shown in Sect. 4.2. After the plain text, cipher text and start-key are loaded into the bu ers the DES Core can start working at full speed. We expect that we can achieve the same data rate for the DESC chip as we achieve with DES ED16x4. The data rate of 402 Mbit/sec corresponds to a key-search rate of 6.29 million keys per second. This means that a brute force attack on DES with 2 56 keys would take 182 years on average. A fully unrolled design would theoretically search 25 million keys per second which is about half the speed of the key-search ASIC introduced in 13].
A cracker box comprising one control board, 16 boards each with four DESC chips (using DES ED16x4 as the DES core) connected to a PC could search the entire key space of DES with a 40-bit key in one hour. The FPGA costs alone for such a box are about $18.000 3 ; when we include 50% overhead for the other required circuits, boards, racks and an additional $1000 for the PC (a low end PC is fast enough) this cracker box would amount to cost $28.000.
Assume that eight such boxes could be attached to one PC and 160 PCs are connected via a network. This machine comprises 81,920 DESC chips and would cost about $35 million. It could nd a DES key of 2 56 bits length in one day on average. We want to notice that the prices for FPGAs are decreasing at a very high rate.
Comparison
We implemented all DES designs based on standard devices from Xilinx with a medium speed grade. With these devices we achieved speeds of up to 402.0 Mbit/sec using four pipelined stages and no loop unrolling. If we compare the reported DES speeds for high speed ASICs (1600 Mbit/sec) 11] and high speed software (13 Mbit/sec) 11], with our best result of 402.0 Mbit/sec we conclude that the speed-up factor from software to FPGAs is about 31, and from FPGAs to ASICs is about 4. It is di cult to provide a fair comparison to this respect but our results clearly show that FPGAs implementations of DES are very attractive for many applications. If we compare our result with the one from 8] we see that even though they used the same device (although at a slower speed grade) their fastest implementation is by factor three slower and requires almost twice as much logic resources as our DES ED16. It is to be noted that their fastest implementation is adjusted to one key.
Using our fastest design as a DES core for the DESC chip we can achieve a key-search rate of 6.29 million keys. For $38 million a machine can be built that breaks DES with 2 56 keys in one day on average. Although it might very well be possible to build a DES-speci c key search machine (much) cheaper, we would like to note that our design allows the application to a wide variety of block ciphers by simply downloading a di erent algorithm in to the FPGAs. Considering the signi cant cost of a key-search machine, this can be a major advantage if more than one algorithm is to be attacked.
